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Infinite Regresses, Infinite Beliefs 
Oliver Black, London 
One way of mapping part of the domain of epistemology is 
to represent various theories as responses to the following 
argument: 
(I) A belief (strictly, a token state of belief) is  
  justified only if a justified belief is a reason for it.  
  (Premiss.) 
(II) There are justified beliefs. (Premiss.) 
(III) The proper ancestral of the reason-relation  
  is irreflexive. (Premiss.) 
(IV) There is an infinite sequence (strictly, a  
  sequence with infinite range) of justified beliefs  
  each of which is a reason for its predecessor,  
  if any. (From (I) to (III).) 
(V) There is no such sequence. (Premiss.) 
(VI) There both is and is not such a sequence.  
  (From (IV) and (V).) 
(VII) Not-(I) / not-(II) / not-(III) / not-(V). (Reductio.) 
The argument instantiates a schema for infinite regress 
arguments generally: 
(i) (∀x1)[Ax1 → (∃x2)(Ax2 & x1Rx2)].  
  (Premiss of generation.) 
(ii) (∃x1)(Ax1). (Premiss of existence.) 
(iii) *R/R is irreflexive. (Premiss of linearity.) 
(iv) (∃s)[Inf(R(s)) & (∀i)(i ε D(s) →  
Asi & Asi+1 & siRsi+1)]. (From (i)-(iii).) 
(v) ~(iv). (Premiss of finitude.) 
(vi) (iv) & ~(iv). (From (iv) and (v).) 
(vii) ~(i) / ~(ii) / ~(iii) / ~(v). (RAA.) 
 
The deduction of (iv) from (i) to (iii) is fairly straightforward 
(Black 1996, 102-103): first, an inductive procedure is 
specified, using the principle of dependent choice, for 
generating from (i)-(iii) a sequence that satisfies the 
second conjunct of (iv); second, the range of the sequence 
is proved to be infinite; third, (iv) is inferred with the rule for 
introducing the existential quantifier. Formerly I used two 
premisses in place of (iii), that (viii) R is irreflexive and (ix) 
R is transitive, to derive (iv) (Black 1987a, 404-405); the 
present formulation is more frugal because (iii) is true if, 
but not only if, (viii) and (ix) are true. 
In these terms the problem of infinite regresses of justifi-
cation is this: which premiss in the argument is false and 
hence should be rejected at (VII)? If (I) is false, a compo-
nent of a form of foundationalism is true: i.e. there are 
beliefs that are basic in the strong sense that they are 
justified even if they do not have reasons (this claim is 
supported by certain theories of privileged access and 
certain externalist theories of justification); or in the weaker 
sense that they are justified even if they do not have 
reasons that are themselves beliefs (this is supported by 
the view that a sense-experience can be a reason for a 
belief); or in the still weaker sense that they are justified 
even if they do not have reasons that are beliefs that are in 
turn justified (this is supported by certain contextualist 
theories of justification). An unjustified belief might itself be 
called basic where it is a reason for some justified belief. 
These claims constitute only parts of foundationalist 
theories of justification; a full theory will also state that, and 
how, justified non-basic beliefs derive their justification 
from a relation to basic beliefs. The account is likely to be 
in recursive terms. Note that the truth of (I) is compatible 
with claims made by other forms of foundationalism, e.g. 
that some justified belief is basic in the sense that - 
contrary to (III) - it is a reason for itself. Note also that, if (I) 
is construed as a material conditional, (II) is true if (I) is 
false.  
Arguments like this are often used to derive a founda-
tionalist conclusion, but there are other possibilities. If (II) 
is false, a radical form of scepticism is true: there are no 
justified beliefs. If (III) is false, there are circles of reasons; 
i.e. there is either (a) a finite sequence of beliefs each of 
which is a reason for its predecessor, if any, and the first is 
a reason for the last or (b) - the limit case already noted - a 
belief that is a reason for itself. If in addition all the other 
premisses are true, a form of coherentism is true; i.e. a 
justified belief is justified by virtue of being one of a set of 
beliefs that form a circle of reasons. 
If (V) is false, there is an infinite sequence of the kind 
whose existence it denies: call them J-sequences. Of the 
premisses (V) is the least likely to be rejected in the 
conclusion, first, because that would make the last three 
steps of the argument redundant - not-(V) is equivalent to 
(IV) - and second because (V) is highly plausible. I believe 
that (V) is true, but it has sometimes been defended by 
bad arguments. I shall discuss two such defences. 
Assume that the reason-relation connects beliefs held by 
the same person (this follows from (DR) below). Then the 
discussion of (V) can be broken into three questions: 
(Q1) Does there exist an infinite sequence of beliefs   
  held by the same person? 
(Q2) Supposing that such sequences exist, does any  
  of them comprise only justified beliefs? 
(Q3) If so, is any of them a J-sequence? 
 
(V) is true iff the answer to any of these is no. The answer 
to (Q1) is yes, provided “beliefs” embraces dispositional as 
well as occurrent beliefs. Let SP be the infinite sequence of 
propositions “2 > 1”, “3 > 1” etc. I believe each of these, so 
there is a corresponding infinite sequence SB such that 
each SBi is a belief of mine whose object is SPi. Clearly 
there are some elements of SP that I never consider: the 
elements of SB corresponding to these are dispositional. 
To this it has been objected that at some stage in SP 
there is a proposition SPn that cannot be the object of a 
belief, occurrent or dispositional, because the number it 
refers to is too large to consider (Williams 1981, 86). This 
objection is the first bad defence of (V). Let it be granted 
that a proposition cannot be believed if it refers to a 
number too large to consider: this cannot be used to show 
that I do not believe each element of SP, for no proposition 
in SP refers to such a number. All the numbers referred to 
by these propositions are natural numbers; but since 




Cantor mathematicians have been considering numbers - 
the alephs - bigger than any natural number. If a number 
has been considered, it is not too large to consider; and, if 
a number is not too large to consider, no number smaller 
than it is too large to consider. So none of the numbers 
referred to by elements of SP is too large to consider. 
Someone who thinks that transfinite arithmetic is miscon-
ceived may reply that, although mathematicians have 
performed operations with the symbols “ℵ0”, “ℵ1” etc, they 
have not been considering numbers. But, even if that is 
right, the answer to (Q1) can be supported by an example 
that raises no qualms about the infinite: the sequence of 
propositions “1 ½ > 1”, “1 ⅔ > 1”, etc. 
A second objection (implicit in Williams 1981, 86), which 
constitutes the second bad defence of (V), runs thus: (a) 
there are natural numbers too large to write down or 
express in any other way; (b) among the elements of SP 
are propositions that refer to such numbers; (c) likewise, 
therefore, these propositions are inexpressible; (d) but a 
proposition is believed only if it can be expressed; so (e) 
no one believes all the elements of SP. (d) is doubtful, but 
the argument anyway fails at (a). It is true that there are 
natural numbers that it is humanly impossible to write 
down in Arabic notation, but these can be expressed with 
abbreviations. It might be replied that, whatever list of 
abbreviations is employed, there will be natural numbers 
too large to express with them. But this can be conceded; 
for to reach (a) the quantifiers in the reply need to be 
reversed, yielding the implausible claim that there are 
natural numbers too large to express with any list of 
abbreviations. 
The answer yes to (Q1) therefore stands. SB also estab-
lishes that answer to (Q2). Distinguish between an actional 
and a statal sense of “justified”: roughly, a belief is action-
ally justified iff the believer has applied a procedure that 
justifies it, and statally justified iff he can apply such a 
procedure. I can apply such a procedure to each SBi: it 
consists in an application of any standard set of axioms for 
number-theory. So SB is an infinite sequence of justified 
beliefs held by the same person. 
It follows that SB establishes the answer yes to (Q3) iff 
each SBi is a reason for its predecessor if any. Whether 
this is so depends on the analysis of the reason-relation. 
There are various kinds of reason connected with beliefs: 
one strong definition is: 
(DR) B1 is a reason for B2 iff there exist a person N 
and propositions P and Q such that (a) B1 is N’s belief 
that-P, (b) B2 is N’s belief that-Q, (c) P confirms Q and (d) 
B2 is based on B1. 
The relation of basing in (d) can be roughly defined thus: 
(DB) N’s belief that-Q is based on his belief that-P iff 
the fact that N believes that-Q is explained by the fact that 
there is an appropriate causal chain from his belief that-P 
to his belief that-Q, 
where “There is a causal chain from X to Y” means “X 
stands to Y in the proper ancestral of the relation 
...causes...”. 
Given (DR), SB is a J-sequence iff, first, each SPi+1 con-
firms SPi and, second, SBi is based on SBi+1. It is implausi-
ble to hold that either of these requirements is met (Black 
1987b, 178-181). I am unable to think of a better example 
of a J-sequence, and so conclude that there is no good 
case for the answer yes to (Q3). But nor is there a decisive 
case for the answer no. Someone might seek to establish 
that answer by invoking (DB) and arguing from the premiss 
that a dispositional belief cannot be a cause; or that an 
infinite sequence of causes is impossible, or would last too 
long; or that a sequence of causes and effects must 
include a first cause; or that there can be no infinite 
sequence of explanations. But no such argument seems to 
work (Black 1987b, 181-190; Black 1988, 436).  
Since (V) is true iff the answer to any of (Q1)-(Q3) is no, 
and since the answer to (Q1) and (Q2) is yes, the intuitive 
plausibility of (V) tips the balance in favour of the answer 
no to (Q3); but that answer will have to be reversed if an 
example of a J-sequence can be found. Can you think of 
one? 
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